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Abstract
We consider a principal-agent setting in which a manager’s compensation de-
pends on a noisy performance signal, and the manager is granted the right to
choose an (accounting) method to determine the value of the performance signal.
We study the eﬀect of the degree of such reporting discretion, measured by the
number of acceptable methods, on the optimal contract, the expected cost of com-
pensation and the manager’s expected utility. We ﬁnd that while an increase in
reporting discretion never harms the manager, the eﬀect on the expected cost of
compensation is more subtle. We identify three main eﬀects of increased report-
ing discretion and characterize the conditions under which the aggregate of these
three eﬀects will lead to a higher or lower cost of compensation.
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11 Introduction
We consider a principal who contracts with a risk- and eﬀort-averse manager in order
to motivate him to deliver the desired eﬀort level. Since the eﬀort provided by the man-
ager is not directly observable, the principal contracts on the basis of a noisy signal, e.g.
based on accounting numbers. Accounting standards such as Generally Accepted Ac-
counting Principles, however, usually oﬀer a variety of acceptable accounting methods
(e.g. LIFO vs FIFO, accelerated vs straight line depreciation, etc.). It has been demon-
strated in several settings that it may be optimal to grant a manager the discretion
to choose an accounting method, even when his compensation depends on performance
measures derived from reported accounting numbers. Demski et al. (1984) show that
when accounting method choice is veriﬁable, delegating the choice to the manager may
be optimal because by motivating the manager to use a diﬀerent accounting method
for diﬀerent realizations of his private information, the manager’s information rent is
reduced. Verrecchia (1986) considers a setting where accounting method choice is par-
tially unveriﬁable, and shows that even when the principal has the option to implicitly
eliminate reporting ﬂexibility by aﬀecting the attractiveness of the acceptable reporting
alternatives, it is in general not optimal to do so. Ozbilgin and Penno (2006) con-
sider a principal-agent model with a set of ex-ante equivalent performance measurement
methods, and ﬁnd that delegating the choice of measurement method to the manager is
optimal if he is suﬃciently risk averse.
Given these various conditions under which delegating accounting method choice
(or, more generally, performance measurement method) to the manager is optimal, and
given the ongoing debate on the ”desired” degree of ﬂexibility in GAAP, it is clearly
relevant and important to investigate the eﬀect of the degree of reporting ﬂexibility on
the internal agency problem. Prior literature shows that risk aversion plays a crucial
role in understanding the eﬀect of increased reporting ﬂexibility on the expected cost
of compensation. Demski (1998) considers a multi-period model where the manager
has private information and can manipulate earnings numbers. He shows that the ex-
2pected cost of compensation when the manager is motivated to manipulate earnings
numbers can be lower than in a situation where he has no private information, so that
results can only be reported truthfully. The underlying reason is that the manager can
only manipulate the performance signal in case the desirable eﬀort level is delivered,
and allowing for manipulation reduces the manager’s risk. Ozbilgin and Penno (2006)
show that when the manager has the discretion to choose the performance measure-
ment method, increased reporting ﬂexibility (as measured by the number of acceptable
performance measurement methods) decreases the expected cost of compensation if the
manager is suﬃciently risk averse. Their setting has no information asymmetry other
than the manager’s action and measurement choices. These results show that more re-
porting ﬂexibility for the manager, either through diversity in acceptable measurement
methods (as in Ozbilgin and Penno, 2006) or through allowed earnings manipulation
(as in Demski, 1998) can be beneﬁcial to the principal since it reduces the manager’s
compensation risk.1
In this paper we take a principal-agent approach similar to Ozbilgin and Penno (2006),
in which the manager’s compensation depends on a noisy performance signal, and the
manager is granted the right to choose an (accounting) method to determine the value
of the performance signal. We study the eﬀect of the degree of reporting ﬂexibility,
measured by the number of acceptable measurement methods, on the expected cost of
compensation and on the manager’s expected utility.2 Our results complement and ex-
tend theirs in several directions. First, the setting in Ozbilgin and Penno (2006) is such
that the manager always earns a limited liability rent. In contrast, whether the limited
liability constraint is binding in our setting is endogenous and depends on the degree of
reporting ﬂexibility. This has important implications for the eﬀect of the level of report-
ing ﬂexibility on the expected cost of compensation. Second, we distinguish two critical
1Penno (2005) considers a manager who can choose between N performance measurement signals
that are i.i.d. exponentially distributed, and shows that the expected cost of compensation is indepen-
dent of N. This remarkable result is due to the nature of the exponential distribution.
2Ozbilgin and Penno (2006) distinguish settings in which the discretion to choose the method rests
with the principal and settings where it rests with the manager. The focus in our paper is on the latter.
3values of the degree of reporting ﬂexibility, both of which are increasing in the degree of
risk aversion of the manager. The ﬁrst critical value determines whether the manager
will earn a limited liability rent. The second critical value determines whether increased
reporting ﬂexibility makes it easier or more diﬃcult to prevent shirking, i.e. whether
a higher bonus is required to motivate high eﬀort. As long as the degree of ﬂexibility
does not exceed either of these two critical values, the limited liability constraint will
not be binding and increased reporting ﬂexibility allows for a lower bonus. As a conse-
quence, higher reporting ﬂexibility then yields a lower expected cost of compensation,
even though it does not aﬀect the manager’s expected utility. Above the two threshold
values, both the size of the bonus and the limited liability rent are strictly increasing in
the degree of reporting ﬂexibility. Increased reporting ﬂexibility is then strictly beneﬁ-
cial to the manager, but harmful to the principal. For intermediate degrees of reporting
ﬂexibility, the eﬀect is ambiguous. We show that increased reporting ﬂexibility may
then be socially optimal in the sense that it makes both the principal and the manager
strictly better oﬀ.
Finally, we show that a minimal level of reporting ﬂexibility may be necessary for
the existence of an optimal contract, i.e. if incentive problems cannot be resolved at
ﬁnite cost, an increase in the degree of reporting ﬂexibility can be suﬃcient to solve this
problem.
Although related, the problem studied in this paper diﬀers in several ways from the
literature on equilibrium earnings management when the Revelation Principle fails to
hold due to, e.g., restricted communication, lack of commitment, or contracting restric-
tions. There, the focus is on settings where the manager has private information and
may be able to manage earnings in a way that would not be accepted if detected by an
audit system. The issue is then whether motivating rejection of earnings management
is optimal. It has been demonstrated that allowing for, and motivating, manipulation
of performance measures may be beneﬁcial to the principal in situations where manip-
ulation requires costly eﬀort (Demski et al. 2004, Liang 2004) or when there is limited
commitment (Arya et al. 1998). In our setting, there is no private information (other
4than the action and measurement method choice) and all available measurement meth-
ods are equally acceptable. The issue is therefore not whether the manager should be
motivated to choose a particular method. Rather, the focus is on the eﬀect of diversity
in measurement methods on the expected cost of compensation, given that the manager
can strategically choose any method from the set of acceptable methods.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the model.
In section 3, we derive the optimal contract, and in section 4 we study the eﬀect of
the number of alternative measurement methods on the optimal contract, the expected
cost of compensation and on the manager’s expected utility. Section 5 discusses the
implications of reporting ﬂexibility for both the principal and the manager. Section 6
concludes. All proofs are deferred to the Appendix.
2 The model
We consider a principal who contracts with a risk- and eﬀort-averse manager in order to
motivate him to deliver the desired eﬀort level. Since the eﬀort provided by the manager
is not directly observable, the principal contracts on the basis of a noisy signal.
The model is similar to the models in Penno (2005) and Ozbilgin and Penno (2006).
Speciﬁcally, there is managerial reporting ﬂexibility in the sense that there are a number
of diﬀerent noisy performance signals, each resulting from equally acceptable measure-
ment methods. The manager has the discretion to choose a measurement method, and
report the corresponding signal to the principal.3 The choice occurs ex post, i.e. after
all the signals have realized. Since it is assumed that veriﬁcation of the signals is costly
for the principal, only the reported signal will be veriﬁed and used for contracting.
There are two eﬀort levels a ∈ {aH,aL}, and a set of N equally acceptable measure-
ment methods. Each method yields a signal that can take two values y ∈ {yH,yL},
3Ozbilgin and Penno (2006) distinguish settings in which the discretion to choose the method rests
with the principal and settings where it rests with the manager, and show that delegating the choice
to the manager is optimal if he is suﬃciently risk averse.
5with yH > yL. The signals resulting from the N diﬀerent measurement methods are
independent and identically distributed random variables yi,i = 1,...,N, for which the
probability distribution is determined by the action chosen by the manager in the fol-
lowing way:
P{yi = yH|a = aH} = 1 − p,
P{yi = yL|a = aH} = p,
(1)
P{yi = yH|a = aL} = 1 − q,
P{yi = yL|a = aL} = q.
(2)
Without loss of generality we assume that q > p, i.e. the probability of outcome
yL is higher under aL than under aH. This implies that the monotone likelihood ratio
property (MLRP) holds, i.e. if aH is the desirable action, yH is a ”good” signal, and yL
is a ”bad” signal. The principal is risk neutral; the manager is a risk averse expected
utility maximizer with utility function u(x) = −e−ρx, where ρ > 0 represents the degree
of risk aversion. The manager is eﬀort-averse, and the cost of providing eﬀort aH (aL)
equals cH (cL), with cH > cL.
The timeline is as follows:
• Date 0: The principal speciﬁes the level of compensation that will be paid to the
manager in case yH, respectively yL, is reported. The manager decides to accept
or reject the contract. If the manager accepts the contract, he then chooses his
eﬀort level a ∈ {aH,aL}.
• Date 1: The manager determines the value yi ∈ {yH,yL} of the signal resulting
from the ith acceptable performance measurement method, for i = 1,··· ,N, and
reports one signal b y ∈ {yi;i = 1,...,N} to the principal. Compensation is paid
and the game ends.
63 The optimal contract
Let us denote s(y) for the compensation received in case y is reported. Without loss
of generality, we focus on the compensation scheme needed to motivate the manager
to take action aH.4 Then, similarly to Dye and Magee (1991), Arya et al. (1992),
and Ozbilgin and Penno (2006), the principal needs to minimize the expected cost of
inducing the agent to choose action aH, taking into account his self-interested behavior
with respect to his action and reporting choices. Speciﬁcally, s(yH) and s(yL) need to
be determined such that the expected cost of compensation is minimized, under the
constraints that: i) the manager reports the most favorable signal (i.e. the one that
maximizes his compensation) among the set of N acceptable signals yi, i = 1,...,N , ii)
providing high eﬀort yields a higher expected utility than providing low eﬀort (incentive
compatibility), iii) staying with the ﬁrm and accepting the contract is preferable to
the ﬁrst best alternative (individual rationality), and, iv) compensation is nonnegative
(limited liability).
Let u(M) denote the manager’s reservation utility. Then, the following optimization
problem needs to be solved:
min
s( )
E [s(b y)|a = aH]
s.t.
b y ∈ arg max
y∈{y1,...,yN}
s(y)
E [u(s(b y) − cH)|a = aH] > u(M)
E [u(s(b y) − cH)|a = aH] > E [u(s(b y) − cL)|a = aL]
s(b y) > 0.
(3)
Clearly,
s(yH) > s(yL) =⇒ b y = max{y
i;i = 1,...,N},
s(yH) 6 s(yL) =⇒ b y = min{y
i;i = 1,...,N}.
4It is easily veriﬁed that, due to the MLRP, the cost minimizing compensation scheme that motivates
the manager to take action aL is given by sL = sH = M + cL, for all N > 1.
7However, it is easy to verify that due to the MLRP, the optimal contract when b y =
min{yi;i = 1,...,N} satisﬁes s(yH) > s(yL). Therefore, b y = max{yi;i = 1,...,N},
i.e. the reported signal b y equals yH if for at least one measurement method it holds
that yi = yH, and equals yL otherwise. Consequently, as in Penno (2005) and Ozbilgin
and Penno (2006), the probability distribution of the reported signal under high eﬀort
depends on the number of acceptable measurement alternatives in the following way:
P{b y = yL|a = aH} = P (max{yi;i ∈ {1,...,N}} = yL|a = aH)
= P
￿
y1 = yL,y2 = yL,...,yN = yL|a = aH
￿
= P (y1 = yL|a = aH)P (y2 = yL|a = aH)···P
￿





P{b y = yH|a = aH} = 1 − p
N. (5)
Similarly, for low eﬀort:
P{b y = yH|a = aL} = 1 − q
N, (6)
P{b y = yL|a = aL} = q
N. (7)
Let us denote s(yH) = sH and s(yL) = sL. Then, (4)-(7) imply that optimization
problem (3) is equivalent to:
min pNsL + (1 − pN)sH
s.t. pNu(sL − cH) + (1 − pN)u(sH − cH) > qNu(sL − cL) + (1 − qN)u(sH − cL)
pNu(sL − cH) + (1 − pN)u(sH − cH) > u(M)
sL > 0, sH > 0.
Our goal is to study the eﬀect of the degree of reporting ﬂexibility, N, on the optimal
incentive contract, on the expected cost of compensation, and on the manager’s expected
utility.
84 The eﬀect of increased reporting ﬂexibility
In this section we ﬁrst determine the optimal contract for any given value of N. This will
then allow us to determine the eﬀect of an increase in the level of reporting ﬂexibility on
the level of compensation and the size of the bonus (subsection 4.1), on the manager’s
expected utility (subsection 4.2), and on the expected cost of compensation (subsection
4.3).
The following theorem shows that, in contrast to Ozbilgin and Penno (2006), the
structure of the optimal compensation contract depends crucially on whether N ex-
ceeds a threshold value, N∗, and yields the optimal compensation levels for both cases.
Moreover, it is shown that an optimal contract only exists if there are suﬃciently many
acceptable measurement methods.
Theorem 1 A minimal level of reporting ﬂexibility is necessary for the existence of an













, if q < 1,
= ∞, if q = 1. (8)
Moreover:





(1 − pN)e−ρ(M+cL) − (1 − qN)e−ρ(M+cH)






qN − pN . (10)
9ii) If N > N∗, the optimal compensation scheme is given by






(1 − pN)e−ρ(M+cL) − (1 − qN)e−ρ(M+cH). (12)
Note that the theorem shows that a minimal degree of reporting ﬂexibility may ac-
tually be necessary to be able to resolve incentive conﬂicts at ﬁnite cost. Suppose that
the manager’s degree of risk aversion and cost of eﬀort are such that
ρ(cH−cL)
lnq−lnp > 1.
Then, there does not exist an optimal contract if the manager is constrained to us-
ing any given measurement method. If he can choose amongst at least N =
ρ(cH−cL)
lnq−lnp
performance measurement methods, there does exist a contract that resolves incentive
problems.
It is clear from Theorem 1 that the way in which the optimal contract is aﬀected by
the level of reporting ﬂexibility depends crucially on whether the threshold value N∗
is exceeded, or, equivalently whether the limited liability constraint is binding. It is
therefore intuitively clear that this threshold value can also play a dominant role in the


















Figure 1: Optimal values of sH (dashed-dotted) and sL (dashed) (left panel) and expected
cost (right panel), as a function of N for ρ = 0.1, cL = 0, cH = 5, M = 3, p = 0.3, q = 0.9.
10This is illustrated in Figure 1. It shows the payoﬀs sL and sH and the expected cost
of the optimal contract, as a function of the number of alternative reports. We see that
the optimal payoﬀs as well as the expected cost of compensation ﬁrst decrease and then
increase as N increases.
Although in the setting in Figure 1 the limited liability constraint becomes binding
at N∗ = 6, and the expected cost of compensation decreases (increases) in N for N <
6 (N > 6), we will show in the sequel that this is not the general pattern.
4.1 The eﬀect on the optimal contract
For the sake of intuition, we view the compensation package as consisting of a level of
compensation sL, to which a bonus sH − sL is added in case of a high report. Let us
use the following notation:
α = e
−ρ(cH−cL). (13)
The parameter α reﬂects the severity of the incentive problem. A lower value of α, e.g.
due to a higher degree of risk aversion and/or a bigger diﬀerence between the cost of
high eﬀort and low eﬀort, ceteris paribus, implies that compensation will be more costly.





lnq−lnp , if 0 < p < q < 1,
= ∞, if q = 1,
= 0, if p = 0.
(14)
In the following proposition we ﬁrst determine the eﬀect of the level of reporting
ﬂexibility (N) on the two levels of compensation sL and sH, as well as on the size of the
bonus (the diﬀerence between the two levels of compensation), where the critical values
N∗ and e N are as deﬁned in (8) and (14), respectively.
Proposition 2 For the optimal compensation contract, the following holds:
5Since the solution of the optimization problem is trivial when p = 0 and q = 1, we can assume
without loss of generality that p > 0 or q < 1.
11i) sH is decreasing in N for N 6 max{N∗, e N}, and increasing in N for N >
max{N∗, e N},
ii) sL is decreasing in N for N 6 N∗, and sL = 0 for N > N∗.
iii) sH − sL is decreasing in N for N 6 e N, and increasing in N for N > e N.
First, the critical level e N determines whether an increase in N makes incentive prob-
lems more severe, or equivalently, whether a higher bonus is required to motivate high
eﬀort. As long as N 6 e N, an increase in the degree of reporting ﬂexibility makes incen-
tive problems less severe, so that the size of the bonus can be decreased. The opposite
holds when N is higher than the critical level e N. Second, the critical level N∗ determines
whether the limited liability constraint is binding. When the degree of reporting ﬂexibil-
ity is lower than the threshold value N∗, the limited liability constraint is not binding.
The fact that the likelihood ratios of the low and the high outcome both increase when
a higher level of discretion is allowed, then implies that both levels of compensation can
be decreased. When the lowerbound on compensation becomes binding (N > N∗), the
compensation for low outcome needs to be ﬁxed at its minimal level. Consequently, the
size of the bonus can only be aﬀected by changing the level of the compensation in case
of high outcome. It needs to be increased when N > e N, but can be decreased when
N 6 e N.
4.2 The eﬀect on the manager’s expected utility
In this section we study the eﬀect of an increase in the degree of reporting ﬂexibility
on the manager’s expected utility. Let us therefore denote CE(N) for the manager’s









where sH and sL are as deﬁned in Theorem 1. The following proposition determines the
eﬀect of N on the manager’s certain equivalent.
12Proposition 3 For the manager’s certain equivalent, the following holds:




qN−pN , for N > N∗.
The certain equivalent is strictly increasing in N for N > N∗.
The above proposition implies that the manager’s utility is not aﬀected by a change
in the degree of reporting ﬂexibility as long as the critical level N∗ is not exceeded.
The expected utility of the manager is then equal to his reservation utility. Above the
critical level N∗, the manager starts earning a rent due to the fact that the limited
liability constraint becomes binding. Since the rent is increasing in N, the manager
strictly beneﬁts from increased reporting ﬂexibility.


















Figure 2: The manager’s certain equivalent, as a function of N, for p = 0.3, q = 0.7,
ρ = 0.1, M = 10, cL = 0, and cH = 7 (solid line), cH = 5 (dashed line) and cH = 3.5
(dashed-dotted line).
This is illustrated in Figure 2. It can be veriﬁed that the limited liability constraint
becomes binding at N∗ = 4, after which the size of the rent increases when the degree
of reporting ﬂexibility increases. The rate of the increase is increasing in the diﬀerence
between the cost of high and low eﬀort.
134.3 The eﬀect on the expected cost of compensation
The analysis in the previous subsections hints at the fact that the eﬀect of reporting
ﬂexibility on the expected cost of compensation will be driven by the following three
eﬀects:
• The decreased risk compensation eﬀect: because pN is strictly decreasing in N if
p > 0, an increase in the degree of reporting ﬂexibility implies that the probability
that the manager will receive the higher compensation level increases. Conse-
quently, he requires less risk compensation (Proposition 2 i) and ii)).
• The incentive compatibility eﬀect: the bonus can be decreased when N < e N
(needs to be increased when N > e N) because an increase in reporting ﬂexibility
then mitigates (aggravates) incentive problems (Proposition 2 iii)).
• The limited liability eﬀect: when N > N∗, the limited liability constraint is bind-
ing, and the manager earns a rent which increases with the level of reporting
ﬂexibility (Proposition 3).
In isolation, each of these eﬀects is either cost increasing or cost decreasing. In
the sequel, we determine under what conditions the cost increasing, respectively cost
decreasing eﬀects will be dominant. Let us start with two special cases: the case where
low eﬀort yields a low signal with certainty, i.e., q = 1, and the case where high eﬀort
yields a high signal with certainty, i.e., p = 0.
Proposition 4
• If q = 1, then N∗ = e N = ∞, and the expected cost of compensation is decreasing
in N.
• If p = 0, then e N = 0, and
– If N 6 N∗, the expected cost of compensation is independent of N.
14– If N > N∗, the expected cost of compensation is increasing in N.
If q = 1, an increase in the degree of reporting ﬂexibility always mitigates incentive
problems (i.e. e N = ∞). Moreover, the lowerbound on compensation never becomes
binding (i.e. N∗ = ∞). Consequently, the expected cost of compensation is mono-
tonically decreasing in the number of alternative measurement methods. In contrast,
if p = 0, compensation always equals sH, so that no risk compensation is required.
However, an increase in reporting ﬂexibility always aggravates incentive problems, since
e N = 0. Combined with the eﬀect of the limited liability rent, this implies that the
expected cost of compensation increases when N > N∗.
The results of Proposition 4 illustrate that the eﬀect of an increase in reporting ﬂexi-
bility on the expected cost of compensation depends to a large extent on the parameter
values: it increases the expected cost if p = 0 and N > N∗, it decreases the expected
cost if q = 1, and it leaves the expected cost unaﬀected if p = 0 and N 6 N∗. It the
sequel we characterize the conditions under which increased reporting ﬂexibility will in-
crease (decrease) the expected cost of compensation for all 0 < p < q < 1. The following
theorem shows that for suﬃciently high values of N, the cost increasing eﬀects of the
limited liability rent and increased incentive problems are dominant.




, then the expected cost of compensation is increasing
in N.




. The following theorem shows
that whether a higher degree of reporting ﬂexibility would increase or decrease the
expected cost of compensation depends on: the probabilities pN and qN, whether N
exceeds the threshold value N∗,6 and the risk aversion/cost parameter α, as deﬁned in
(13).
6Given pN and qN, the number of alternative signals N aﬀects the magnitude of the derivative of
the expected cost of compensation with respect to N, but not its sign.




be given, and denote
S = {(u,v) ∈ [0,1] × [0,1] : (u − 2uv + v)lnu − 2v(1 − u)lnv > 0}. (15)
Then, there exists an α∗ and an α∗
b such that:7
i) If N < N∗, an increase in N








ii) If N∗ 6 N 6 e N, an increase in N increases (decreases) the expected cost of
compensation iﬀ α > α∗
b (α < α∗
b).
Figure 3 illustrates the set S.











Figure 3: The combinations of pN and qN for which (pN,qN) ∈ S.
7The critical values α∗ and α∗
b depend on pN and qN. In order to avoid overloaded notation, we do
not explicitly denote this dependence, unless it is required for clarity.
165 Implications
In this section we use Proposition 3 and Theorem 6 to study the implications of increased
reporting ﬂexibility for both the principal and the manager. We will distinguish four
ranges of values of N.
The case where N 6 min{N∗, e N}.
In this case, the limited liability constraint is not binding (because N 6 N∗), and an
increase in reporting ﬂexibility mitigates incentive problems and therefore allows for a
lower bonus (because N 6 e N). Now it can be veriﬁed numerically that:8
N 6 e N =⇒ α < α
∗. (16)
It therefore follows from Theorem 6 i) that the expected cost of compensation will be
decreasing in N. Moreover, since the limited liability constraint is not binding, it follows
from Proposition 3 that the manager does not earn a rent. This yields:
Implication 1: If N is suﬃciently low (N 6 min{N∗, e N}), an increase in the degree
of reporting ﬂexibility makes the principal strictly better oﬀ, while leaving the manager’s
utility unaﬀected.
The case where e N 6 N 6 N∗.
In this case, the limited liability constraint is still not binding (because N 6 N∗), but
an increase in reporting ﬂexibility now aggravates incentive problems and thus requires a
higher bonus (since e N 6 N). The eﬀect on the expected cost of compensation therefore
depends on whether the cost reducing eﬀect of reduced compensation risk outweighs
the cost increasing eﬀect of increased incentive problems. It follows from Theorem
6 i) that the aggregate eﬀect of increased reporting ﬂexibility on the expected cost
of compensation depends on both the risk aversion/cost parameter α, as well as on
￿
pN,qN￿
. Combined with the result from Proposition 3, this yields:




17Implication 2: If e N 6 N 6 N∗, an increase in the degree of reporting ﬂexibility leaves
the manager’s utility unaﬀected, and












/ ∈ S. We illustrate this in Figure 4.



























Figure 4: Left panel: Expected cost of compensation in excess of M + cH as a function
of N, for cL = 0,cH = 100,M = 85000,p = 0.46,q = 0.52, and α = 0.99. Right panel:
The critical value α∗ as a function of N for p = 0.46,q = 0.52.
For the parameter values in Figure 4, it holds that e N = 2 and N∗ = 26. The
critical value of α needed to make the increased incentive problems eﬀect dominant, α∗,
decreases for N 6 5, and increases for N > 5. It can be veriﬁed that α = 0.99 > α∗ and
￿
pN,qN￿
∈ S for N ∈ [3,8]. The expected cost of compensation therefore increases over
that range, but decreases outside that range.
18The case where N∗ 6 N 6 e N.
In this case, the limited liability constraint is binding (because N > N∗), but the
degree of reporting ﬂexibility is suﬃciently low so that an increase in reporting ﬂexibility
allows for a lower bonus (because N 6 e N). It then follows from Theorem 6 ii) that the
cost decreasing eﬀects (decreased risk compensation and decreased incentive problems)
dominate the limited liability eﬀect if the manager is suﬃciently risk averse, i.e. if
α < α∗
b. Combined with the results of Proposition 3, this yields the following:
Implication 3: If N∗ 6 N 6 e N and α < α∗
b, an increase in the degree of reporting
ﬂexibility is strictly beneﬁcial to both the manager and the principal.
We illustrate this result in Figure 5.























Figure 5: The left panel: the expected cost of compensation as a function of N, for
p = 0.875, q = 0.995, ρ = 0.01, cL = 0, cH = 2 and M = 0.094, so that α = 0.98. The
right panel: α∗
b as a function of N, for p = 0.875 and q = 0.995.
For the parameter values in Figure 5, it can be veriﬁed that N∗ = 2, and e N = 26,
and that α = 0.98 < α∗
b for all N 6 5. Combined with Implication 1, this implies
that the expected cost of compensation decreases for N 6 5, and increases for N > 5.
19Interestingly, for values of N between 2 and 5, the expected cost of compensation is
decreasing in N, even though an increase in N strictly increases the manager’s rent.
The case where N > max{N∗, e N}.
In this case, the limited liability constraint is binding, and an increase in reporting
ﬂexibility would require a higher bonus. We know from Theorem 5 that the combination
of increased incentive problems and limited liability then implies that the expected cost
of compensation will increase when the level of reporting ﬂexibility increases. Moreover,
it follows from Proposition 3 that the manager’s limited liability rent will also increase.
Implication 4: If N is suﬃciently high (N > max{N∗, e N}), an increase in the degree
of reporting ﬂexibility makes the principal strictly worse oﬀ, while making the manager
strictly better oﬀ.
6 Conclusion
We identiﬁed the three main eﬀects of an increase in the level of reporting ﬂexibility
on managerial compensation, in a setting where the manager has the discretion to choose
the method. First, it reduces the manager’s risk because the probability that he will
be able to report a favorable signal increases. Second, the size of the bonus required
to motivate the manager to provide high eﬀort can be decreased if the current level
of discretion is suﬃciently low, but the opposite would happen if that level is already
relatively high. Finally, the fact that the manager faces limited liability signiﬁcantly
aﬀects the eﬀect of increased reporting ﬂexibility. The limited liability constraint will
be binding if the degree of reporting ﬂexibility is, or becomes, suﬃciently high. Below the
threshold value, the manager’s expected utility is constant and equal to his reservation
utility. Above the threshold value however, the manager earns a limited liability rent,
which is increasing in the degree of reporting ﬂexibility. The latter implies that the
manager strictly beneﬁts from increased reporting ﬂexibility if that level is high enough.
Whether or not increased reporting ﬂexibility would be harmful to the principal
20depends on the aggregate of the above described eﬀects. For suﬃciently low degrees of
reporting ﬂexibility, the cost decreasing eﬀects are unambiguously dominant, i.e. the
principal strictly beneﬁts from a higher degree of reporting ﬂexibility; the opposite holds
for suﬃciently high degrees of reporting ﬂexibility. For intermediate values, the eﬀect is
ambiguous, and depends on the probability distributions of the signals, the manager’s
degree of risk aversion as well as his cost parameters. For a broad set of parameter values,
increased reporting ﬂexibility would be strictly beneﬁcial to the principal, and would
leave the manager’s utility unaﬀected. We also identify conditions under which both the
principal and the manager are strictly better oﬀ when more performance measurement
alternatives are available.
21References
[1] Arya A.,J. Glover, and S. Sunder (1998). Earnings management and the
revelation principle. Review of Accounting Studies 3: 7:34.
[2] Arya A., R.A. Young, and P. Woodlock (1992), Managerial Reporting Dis-
cretion and the Truthfulness of Disclosures, Economic Letters 39, 163-168.
[3] Demski J.S. (1998), Performance Measure Manipulation, Contemporary Account-
ing Research 15, 3, 261-285.
[4] Demski J.S, H. Frimor and D.E.M. Sappington (2004), Eﬃcient Manipula-
tion in a Repeated Setting, Journal of Accounting Research 42,1, 31-49.
[5] Demski J.S, J.M. Patell and M.A. Wolfson (1984), Decentralized Choice of
Monitoring Systems, The Accounting Review 59,1, 16-34.
[6] Dye R.A, and R.P. Magee (1991), Discretion in Reporting Managerial Perfor-
mance, Economic Letters 35, 359-363.
[7] Dye R.A, and R.E. Verrecchia(1995), Discretion vs. Uniformity: Choices
among GAAP, The Accounting Review 70,3, 389-415.
[8] Fishman J.F., and K.M. Hagerty (1990), The Optimal Amount of Discretion
to Allow in Disclosure, Quarterly Journal of Economics 105, 2, 427-444.
[9] Lambert R.A. (2001), Contracting Theory and Accounting, Journal of Account-
ing and Economics 32, 3-87.
[10] Liang P.J. (2004), Equilibrium Earnings Management, Incentive Contracts, and
Accounting Standards, Contemporary Accounting Research 21, 3, 685-717.
[11] Ozbilgin, M. and M. Penno (2006), The Assignment of Decision Rights in For-
mal Information Systems, working paper (An earlier version is available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=605481.)
22[12] Penno M. (2005), The Contracting Value of Tainted Reports in Cost Reduction
Settings, European Economic Review 49, 1979-1985.
[13] Verrecchia R.E. (1986), Managerial Discretion in the Choice among Financial
Reporting Alternatives, Journal of Accounting and Economics 8, 175-195.
23Appendix
Remarks:
1. Note that if a real-valued function f(·) is increasing (decreasing) over the range
[l,b], then f(·) is clearly also increasing (decreasing) over all integer values in that
range. Therefore, although N can only take integer values, we can conclude that
f(N) is increasing (decreasing) in N over a certain range if f′(·) > 0 (< 0) over
that range.
2. The following properties will be used throughout the proofs:
d
dn(xn) = xn ln(x), for all x > 0,
ln(x) < 0, for all x ∈ [0,1],
ln(x) 6 x − 1, for all x > 0,
ln(xn) = nln(x), for all x > 0 and n ∈ N,
ln(xy) = ln(x) + ln(y), for all x > 0, y > 0.
Proof of Theorem 1
i) Let us ﬁrst consider the optimization problem without the limited liability constraints.
Then it follows immediately from the KKT-conditions that the individual rationality
and the incentive compatibility constraint are both binding.
It can be veriﬁed that the solution equals sL = −1




(1 − pN)e−ρ(M+cL) − (1 − qN)e−ρ(M+cH)




qN − pN . (18)
The resulting payment scheme is feasible (i.e., 0 6 sL < ∞, 0 6 sH < ∞) iﬀ 0 < x∗ 6 1
and 0 < y∗ 6 1. If x∗ 6 0 or y∗ 6 0, then an optimal compensation scheme does not
exist. If x∗ > 1 or y∗ > 1, then the limited liability constraint is violated.
24Note that y∗ 6 x∗ and
y







so that indeed an optimum exists iﬀ N >
ρ(cH−cL)
lnq−lnp .
Furthermore, the limited liability constraint is binding iﬀ
x
∗ > 1 ⇐⇒
1 − qN
1 − pN >
1 − e−ρ(M+cL)
1 − e−ρ(M+cH).




1 − pN >
1 − e−ρ(M+cL)
1 − e−ρ(M+cH).
Given the deﬁnition of N∗, it is suﬃcient to show that
1−qN















1 − pN lnp −
qN
1 − qN lnq
￿
.








(lnx + 1)(1 − x) + xlnx
(1 − x)2 ,
=
lnx − xlnx + 1 − x + xlnx
(1 − x)2 ,
=
lnx + 1 − x
(1 − x)2 6 0.


































1 − pN = 1.
Therefore,
1 − qN
1 − pN 6
1 − e−ρ(M+cL)
1 − e−ρ(M+cH) ⇔ N 6 N
∗.
ii) It follows from the proof of i) that
1 − qN
1 − pN >
1 − e−ρ(M+cL)
1 − e−ρ(M+cH)
implies that x∗ > 1, so that the limited liability constraint sL > 0 is binding. It then
follows that the optimal compensation under yH satisﬁes
sH = min−1
ρ ln(y)
s.t. eρcH[pNx + (1 − pN)y] 6 eρcL[qNx + (1 − qN)y]
eρcH[pNx + (1 − pN)y] 6 e−ρM
0 < y 6 1
x = 1












(1 − pN)e−ρ(M+cL) − (1 − qN)e−ρ(M+cH). (20)
26Proof of Proposition 2
Let us introduce the following notation:
e x =
qNα − pN + (1 − α)
qN − pN ,
e y =
qNα − pN
qN − pN ,
e yc =
qNα − pN
qNα − pN + (1 − α)
.
Then, for N 6 N∗,













Moreover, for all N,




Therefore, it is suﬃcient to show that: i) e x is increasing in N, ii) e y is increasing in N,



















(qN − pN)2 ,
=
1 − α
(qN − pN)2 · (lnp · p
N(1 − q















where the function g(·) is as deﬁned in (19).
27ii) Since
e y = e x −
1 − α






















N) − lnq · q
N(1 − p
N) − lnp · p








N [lnq − lnp], (22)
> 0.




= (1 − α) ∗
αqN lnq − pN lnp
(αqN − pN + 1 − α)2 , (23)










⇐⇒ N > e N.
Proof of Proposition 3
Let us denote e sL and e sH for the optimal compensation scheme when there is no limited
liability constraint. Then it follows immediately from the proof of Theorem 1 that e sL
and e sH are given by (9) and (10), respectively, for any given value of N.
Note that
sL = e sL, sH = e sH, if N < N∗,
sL = e sL − e sL = 0, sH = e sH − e sL, if N > N∗.
(24)
i.e., as a consequence of the limited liability constraint, the compensation increases with
the amount −e sL.
28As can be seen from the proof of Theorem 1, the individual rationality constraint is
binding when N < N∗. Given (24), this implies that the manager’s certain equivalent
is given by:
CE(N) = M, if N < N∗,
= M − e sL, if N > N∗.
Now ﬁrst note that the rent CE(N) − M is zero when N < N∗, and equals −e sL when
N > N∗. It follows from the proof of Proposition 2 that −e sL is strictly increasing in N.
Proof of Proposition 4
First consider the case q = 1. Then, the expected cost of compensation equals
sL + (1 − p
N)(sH − sL),
where
sL = M + cL,





1 − pN .





1 − pN =
￿
1 − α









where the inequality follows from the fact that lnx 6 x − 1.
Now consider the case where p = 0. Then, the expected cost of compensation is given
by sH, and it follows immediately from Proposition 2 and the fact that e N = 0, that sH
is decreasing (increasing) in N for N 6 N∗ (N > N∗).
Proof of Theorem 5
Suppose that N > max{N∗, e N}. Then, we know that sL = 0 and sH is increasing in N.
Moreover, since sL = 0, the expected cost equals
(1 − p
N)sH.
29The fact that 1 − pN is increasing in N completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 6
First consider the case where N 6 N∗. Then the derivative with respect to N of the
expected cost equals
D(α) = −p
















lnp · pN(1 − qN) − lnq · qN(1 − pN)










qNα − pN .















lnp · pN ￿
1 − qN￿
− lnq · qN ￿
1 − pN￿























lnp · pN ￿
1 − qN￿
− lnq · qN ￿
1 − pN￿￿
(qN − pN)












(lnp − lnq)qN(1 − pN)








G(z) = 0. (26)
For ease of notation, we deﬁne
c1 =
lnp · pN ￿
1 − qN￿
− lnq · qN ￿
1 − pN￿
qN − pN > 0,















G(z) = c1f (z) − c2g (z).


















z2 (1 + z)
2 ((c2 − 2c1)z + c2 − c1).
Now, notice that
c1 − c2 =
1























Now, we consider the following two situations:
• 2c1 6 c2
Then since c1 − c2 < 0, it follows that G′ (z) > 0 for all z. Combined with (25)
and (26) this implies that G(z) 6 0 for all z.
• 2c1 > c2
Then, since c1 − c2 < 0 and 2c1 − c2 > 0 we know that G
′
(z) has exactly one
strictly positive root. Therefore, G
′
(z) > 0 for z 6 e z and G
′
(z) < 0 for z > e z,
where e z denotes the unique positive root of G
′
(z). Again, combined with (25)
and (26), this implies that G(z) has a unique positive root z∗. This implies that




z∗ + qN .
31It now only remains to see that, since lnp =
lnpN
N and lnq =
lnqN
N , it follows that
￿
pN,qN￿
∈ S iﬀ 2c1 > c2.
Now, consider the case where N > N∗. Then, given (24), it follows that the derivative
with respect to N of the expected cost equals
Db (α) = −p































lnp · pN ￿
1 − qN￿
− lnq · qN ￿
1 − pN￿














z→0Gb (z) = −∞ (27)
lim
z→∞
Gb (z) = 0. (28)















N lnp · pN ￿
1 − qN￿
− lnq · qN ￿
1 − pN￿
qN − pN > 0
c2 = −p
N lnp > 0.
Since G
′
b (0) = +∞ and −
c1
pN < 0, if follows that G
′
b (z) has exactly one strictly positive
root. This concludes the proof.
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